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Table of Contents
To use this tool, you may specify --tool=memcheck
on the Valgrind command line. You don't have to, though, since Memcheck
is the default tool.
Memcheck is a memory error detector. It can detect the following problems that are common in C and C++ programs.
Accessing memory you shouldn't, e.g. overrunning and underrunning heap blocks, overrunning the top of the stack, and accessing memory after it has been freed.
Using undefined values, i.e. values that have not been initialised, or that have been derived from other undefined values.
Incorrect freeing of heap memory, such as double-freeing heap
blocks, or mismatched use of
malloc/new/new[]
versus
free/delete/delete[]
Mismatches will also be reported for sized and aligned
allocation and deallocation functions if the deallocation value
does not match the allocation value.
Overlapping src and
dst pointers in
memcpy and related
functions.
Passing a fishy (presumably negative) value to the
size parameter of a memory
allocation function.
Using a size value of 0
with realloc.
Using an alignment value that
is not a power of two.
Memory leaks.
Problems like these can be difficult to find by other means, often remaining undetected for long periods, then causing occasional, difficult-to-diagnose crashes.
Memcheck also provides Execution Trees memory
profiling using the command line
option --xtree-memory and the monitor command
xtmemory.
Memcheck issues a range of error messages. This section presents a quick summary of what error messages mean. The precise behaviour of the error-checking machinery is described in Details of Memcheck's checking machinery.
For example:
Invalid read of size 4 at 0x40F6BBCC: (within /usr/lib/libpng.so.2.1.0.9) by 0x40F6B804: (within /usr/lib/libpng.so.2.1.0.9) by 0x40B07FF4: read_png_image(QImageIO *) (kernel/qpngio.cpp:326) by 0x40AC751B: QImageIO::read() (kernel/qimage.cpp:3621) Address 0xBFFFF0E0 is not stack'd, malloc'd or free'd
This happens when your program reads or writes memory at a place
which Memcheck reckons it shouldn't. In this example, the program did a
4-byte read at address 0xBFFFF0E0, somewhere within the system-supplied
library libpng.so.2.1.0.9, which was called from somewhere else in the
same library, called from line 326 of qpngio.cpp,
and so on.
Memcheck tries to establish what the illegal address might relate
to, since that's often useful. So, if it points into a block of memory
which has already been freed, you'll be informed of this, and also where
the block was freed. Likewise, if it should turn out to be just off
the end of a heap block, a common result of off-by-one-errors in
array subscripting, you'll be informed of this fact, and also where the
block was allocated. If you use the --read-var-info option
Memcheck will run more slowly
but may give a more detailed description of any illegal address.
In this example, Memcheck can't identify the address. Actually the address is on the stack, but, for some reason, this is not a valid stack address -- it is below the stack pointer and that isn't allowed. In this particular case it's probably caused by GCC generating invalid code, a known bug in some ancient versions of GCC.
Note that Memcheck only tells you that your program is about to access memory at an illegal address. It can't stop the access from happening. So, if your program makes an access which normally would result in a segmentation fault, you program will still suffer the same fate -- but you will get a message from Memcheck immediately prior to this. In this particular example, reading junk on the stack is non-fatal, and the program stays alive.
For example:
Conditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value(s) at 0x402DFA94: _IO_vfprintf (_itoa.h:49) by 0x402E8476: _IO_printf (printf.c:36) by 0x8048472: main (tests/manuel1.c:8)
An uninitialised-value use error is reported when your program
uses a value which hasn't been initialised -- in other words, is
undefined. Here, the undefined value is used somewhere inside the
printf machinery of the C library. This error was
reported when running the following small program:
int main()
{
int x;
printf ("x = %d\n", x);
}
It is important to understand that your program can copy around
junk (uninitialised) data as much as it likes. Memcheck observes this
and keeps track of the data, but does not complain. A complaint is
issued only when your program attempts to make use of uninitialised
data in a way that might affect your program's externally-visible behaviour.
In this example, x is uninitialised. Memcheck observes
the value being passed to _IO_printf and thence to
_IO_vfprintf, but makes no comment. However,
_IO_vfprintf has to examine the value of
x so it can turn it into the corresponding ASCII string,
and it is at this point that Memcheck complains.
Sources of uninitialised data tend to be:
Local variables in procedures which have not been initialised, as in the example above.
The contents of heap blocks (allocated with
malloc, new, or a similar
function) before you (or a constructor) write something there.
To see information on the sources of uninitialised data in your
program, use the --track-origins=yes option. This
makes Memcheck run more slowly, but can make it much easier to track down
the root causes of uninitialised value errors.
Memcheck checks all parameters to system calls:
It checks all the direct parameters themselves, whether they are initialised.
Also, if a system call needs to read from a buffer provided by your program, Memcheck checks that the entire buffer is addressable and its contents are initialised.
Also, if the system call needs to write to a user-supplied buffer, Memcheck checks that the buffer is addressable.
After the system call, Memcheck updates its tracked information to precisely reflect any changes in memory state caused by the system call.
Here's an example of two system calls with invalid parameters:
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main( void )
{
char* arr = malloc(10);
int* arr2 = malloc(sizeof(int));
write( 1 /* stdout */, arr, 10 );
exit(arr2[0]);
}
You get these complaints ...
Syscall param write(buf) points to uninitialised byte(s)
at 0x25A48723: __write_nocancel (in /lib/tls/libc-2.3.3.so)
by 0x259AFAD3: __libc_start_main (in /lib/tls/libc-2.3.3.so)
by 0x8048348: (within /auto/homes/njn25/grind/head4/a.out)
Address 0x25AB8028 is 0 bytes inside a block of size 10 alloc'd
at 0x259852B0: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:130)
by 0x80483F1: main (a.c:5)
Syscall param exit(error_code) contains uninitialised byte(s)
at 0x25A21B44: __GI__exit (in /lib/tls/libc-2.3.3.so)
by 0x8048426: main (a.c:8)
... because the program has (a) written uninitialised junk
from the heap block to the standard output, and (b) passed an
uninitialised value to exit. Note that the first
error refers to the memory pointed to by
buf (not
buf itself), but the second error
refers directly to exit's argument
arr2[0].
For example:
Invalid free() at 0x4004FFDF: free (vg_clientmalloc.c:577) by 0x80484C7: main (tests/doublefree.c:10) Address 0x3807F7B4 is 0 bytes inside a block of size 177 free'd at 0x4004FFDF: free (vg_clientmalloc.c:577) by 0x80484C7: main (tests/doublefree.c:10)
Memcheck keeps track of the blocks allocated by your program
with malloc/new,
so it can know exactly whether or not the argument to
free/delete is
legitimate or not. Here, this test program has freed the same block
twice. As with the illegal read/write errors, Memcheck attempts to
make sense of the address freed. If, as here, the address is one
which has previously been freed, you wil be told that -- making
duplicate frees of the same block easy to spot. You will also get this
message if you try to free a pointer that doesn't point to the start of a
heap block.
In the following example, a block allocated with
new[] has wrongly been deallocated with
free:
Mismatched free() / delete / delete [] at 0x40043249: free (vg_clientfuncs.c:171) by 0x4102BB4E: QGArray::~QGArray(void) (tools/qgarray.cpp:149) by 0x4C261C41: PptDoc::~PptDoc(void) (include/qmemarray.h:60) by 0x4C261F0E: PptXml::~PptXml(void) (pptxml.cc:44) Address 0x4BB292A8 is 0 bytes inside a block of size 64 alloc'd at 0x4004318C: operator new[](unsigned int) (vg_clientfuncs.c:152) by 0x4C21BC15: KLaola::readSBStream(int) const (klaola.cc:314) by 0x4C21C155: KLaola::stream(KLaola::OLENode const *) (klaola.cc:416) by 0x4C21788F: OLEFilter::convert(QCString const &) (olefilter.cc:272)
In C++ it's important to deallocate memory in a
way compatible with how it was allocated.
Most of the time in C++ you will write code that
uses new expression and delete
expression
(see cppreference
new expression
and cppreference
delete expression). A new expression will
call operator new to perform the allocation and
then call the constructor (if one exists) on the object. Similarly a
delete expression will call the destructor on the object (if one
exists) and then call operator delete. The array
overloads call constructors/destructors for each object in the
array.
The deal is:
If allocated with
malloc,
calloc,
realloc,
valloc or
memalign, you must
deallocate with free.
If allocated with new, you must deallocate
with delete.
If allocated with new[], you must
deallocate with delete[].
Mixing types of allocators and deallocators is undefined behaviour. That means that on some platforms you might not have any problems, but the same program may then crash on a different platform, Solaris for example. So it's best to fix it properly. According to the KDE folks "it's amazing how many C++ programmers don't know this".
The reason behind the requirement is as follows. In some C++
implementations, delete[] must be used for
objects allocated by new[] because the compiler
stores the size of the array and the pointer-to-member to the
destructor of the array's content just before the pointer actually
returned. delete doesn't account for this and
will get confused, possibly corrupting the heap. Even if there is no
corruption there are likely to be resource leaks since using the wrong
delete may result in the wrong number of destructors being
called.
C++ aligned allocations need to be freed using aligned delete with the same alignment.
The following C library functions copy some data from one
memory block to another (or something similar):
memcpy,
strcpy,
strncpy,
strcat,
strncat.
The blocks pointed to by their src and
dst pointers aren't allowed to overlap.
The POSIX standards have wording along the lines "If copying takes place
between objects that overlap, the behavior is undefined." Therefore,
Memcheck checks for this.
For example:
==27492== Source and destination overlap in memcpy(0xbffff294, 0xbffff280, 21) ==27492== at 0x40026CDC: memcpy (mc_replace_strmem.c:71) ==27492== by 0x804865A: main (overlap.c:40)
You don't want the two blocks to overlap because one of them could get partially overwritten by the copying.
You might think that Memcheck is being overly pedantic reporting
this in the case where dst is less than
src. For example, the obvious way to
implement memcpy is by copying from the first
byte to the last. However, the optimisation guides of some
architectures recommend copying from the last byte down to the first.
Also, some implementations of memcpy zero
dst before copying, because zeroing the
destination's cache line(s) can improve performance.
The moral of the story is: if you want to write truly portable code, don't make any assumptions about the language implementation.
All memory allocation functions take an argument specifying the
size of the memory block that should be allocated. Clearly, the requested
size should be a non-negative value and is typically not excessively large.
For instance, it is extremely unlikly that the size of an allocation
request exceeds 2**63 bytes on a 64-bit machine. It is much more likely that
such a value is the result of an erroneous size calculation and is in effect
a negative value (that just happens to appear excessively large because
the bit pattern is interpreted as an unsigned integer).
Such a value is called a "fishy value".
The size argument of the following allocation functions
is checked for being fishy:
malloc,
calloc,
realloc,
memalign,
posix_memalign,
aligned_alloc,
new,
new [].
__builtin_new,
__builtin_vec_new,
For calloc both arguments are checked.
For example:
==32233== Argument 'size' of function malloc has a fishy (possibly negative) value: -3 ==32233== at 0x4C2CFA7: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:298) ==32233== by 0x400555: foo (fishy.c:15) ==32233== by 0x400583: main (fishy.c:23)
In earlier Valgrind versions those values were being referred to as "silly arguments" and no back-trace was included.
The (ab)use or realloc to also do the job of free
has been poorly understood for a long time. In the C17 standard
ISO/IEC 9899:2017] the behaviour of realloc when the size argument
is zero is specified as implementation defined. Memcheck warns about
the non-portable use or realloc.
For example:
==77609== realloc() with size 0 ==77609== at 0x48502B8: realloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:1450) ==77609== by 0x201989: main (realloczero.c:8) ==77609== Address 0x5464040 is 0 bytes inside a block of size 4 alloc'd ==77609== at 0x484CBB4: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:397) ==77609== by 0x201978: main (realloczero.c:7)
C and C++ have several functions that allow the user to obtain aligned memory.
Typically this is done for performance reasons so that the memory will be cache line
or memory page aligned. C has the functions memalign,
posix_memalign and aligned_alloc.
C++ has numerous overloads of operator new and
operator delete. Of these, posix_memalign is quite clearly
specified, the others vary quite widely between implementations. Valgrind will generate
errors for values of alignment that are invalid on any platform.
memalign will produce errors if the alignment
is zero or not a multiple of two.
posix_memalign will produce errors if the alignment
is less than sizeof(size_t), not a multiple of two or if the size is zero.
aligned_alloc will produce errors if the alignment
is not a multiple of two , if the size is zero or if the size is not an integral
multiple of the alignment.
aligned new will produce errors if the alignment
is zero or not a multiple of two. The nothrow overloads
will return a NULL pointer. The non-nothrow overloads will abort Valgrind.
aligned delete will produce errors if the alignment
is zero or not a multiple of two or if the alignment is not the same as that used by
aligned new.
sized delete will produce errors if the size
is not the same as that used by new.
sized aligned delete combines the error conditions
of the individual sized and aligned delete operators.
Example output:
==65825== Invalid alignment value: 3 (should be power of 2) ==65825== at 0x485197E: memalign (vg_replace_malloc.c:1740) ==65825== by 0x201CD2: main (memalign.c:39)
Memcheck keeps track of all heap blocks issued in response to
calls to
malloc/new et al.
So when the program exits, it knows which blocks have not been freed.
If --leak-check is set appropriately, for each
remaining block, Memcheck determines if the block is reachable from pointers
within the root-set. The root-set consists of (a) general purpose registers
of all threads, and (b) initialised, aligned, pointer-sized data words in
accessible client memory, including stacks.
There are two ways a block can be reached. The first is with a "start-pointer", i.e. a pointer to the start of the block. The second is with an "interior-pointer", i.e. a pointer to the middle of the block. There are several ways we know of that an interior-pointer can occur:
The pointer might have originally been a start-pointer and have been moved along deliberately (or not deliberately) by the program. In particular, this can happen if your program uses tagged pointers, i.e. if it uses the bottom one, two or three bits of a pointer, which are normally always zero due to alignment, in order to store extra information.
It might be a random junk value in memory, entirely unrelated, just a coincidence.
It might be a pointer to the inner char array of a C++
std::string. For example, some
compilers add 3 words at the beginning of the std::string to
store the length, the capacity and a reference count before the
memory containing the array of characters. They return a pointer
just after these 3 words, pointing at the char array.
Some code might allocate a block of memory, and use the first 8
bytes to store (block size - 8) as a 64bit number.
sqlite3MemMalloc does this.
It might be a pointer to an array of C++ objects (which possess
destructors) allocated with new[]. In
this case, some compilers store a "magic cookie" containing the array
length at the start of the allocated block, and return a pointer to just
past that magic cookie, i.e. an interior-pointer.
See this
page for more information.
It might be a pointer to an inner part of a C++ object using multiple inheritance.
You can optionally activate heuristics to use during the leak
search to detect the interior pointers corresponding to
the stdstring,
length64,
newarray
and multipleinheritance cases. If the
heuristic detects that an interior pointer corresponds to such a case,
the block will be considered as reachable by the interior
pointer. In other words, the interior pointer will be treated
as if it were a start pointer.
With that in mind, consider the nine possible cases described by the following figure.
Pointer chain AAA Leak Case BBB Leak Case
------------- ------------- -------------
(1) RRR ------------> BBB DR
(2) RRR ---> AAA ---> BBB DR IR
(3) RRR BBB DL
(4) RRR AAA ---> BBB DL IL
(5) RRR ------?-----> BBB (y)DR, (n)DL
(6) RRR ---> AAA -?-> BBB DR (y)IR, (n)DL
(7) RRR -?-> AAA ---> BBB (y)DR, (n)DL (y)IR, (n)IL
(8) RRR -?-> AAA -?-> BBB (y)DR, (n)DL (y,y)IR, (n,y)IL, (_,n)DL
(9) RRR AAA -?-> BBB DL (y)IL, (n)DL
Pointer chain legend:
- RRR: a root set node or DR block
- AAA, BBB: heap blocks
- --->: a start-pointer
- -?->: an interior-pointer
Leak Case legend:
- DR: Directly reachable
- IR: Indirectly reachable
- DL: Directly lost
- IL: Indirectly lost
- (y)XY: it's XY if the interior-pointer is a real pointer
- (n)XY: it's XY if the interior-pointer is not a real pointer
- (_)XY: it's XY in either case
Every possible case can be reduced to one of the above nine. Memcheck merges some of these cases in its output, resulting in the following four leak kinds.
"Still reachable". This covers cases 1 and 2 (for the BBB blocks) above. A start-pointer or chain of start-pointers to the block is found. Since the block is still pointed at, the programmer could, at least in principle, have freed it before program exit. "Still reachable" blocks are very common and arguably not a problem. So, by default, Memcheck won't report such blocks individually.
"Definitely lost". This covers case 3 (for the BBB blocks) above. This means that no pointer to the block can be found. The block is classified as "lost", because the programmer could not possibly have freed it at program exit, since no pointer to it exists. This is likely a symptom of having lost the pointer at some earlier point in the program. Such cases should be fixed by the programmer.
"Indirectly lost". This covers cases 4 and 9 (for the BBB blocks) above. This means that the block is lost, not because there are no pointers to it, but rather because all the blocks that point to it are themselves lost. For example, if you have a binary tree and the root node is lost, all its children nodes will be indirectly lost. Because the problem will disappear if the definitely lost block that caused the indirect leak is fixed, Memcheck won't report such blocks individually by default.
"Possibly lost". This covers cases 5--8 (for the BBB blocks) above. This means that a chain of one or more pointers to the block has been found, but at least one of the pointers is an interior-pointer. This could just be a random value in memory that happens to point into a block, and so you shouldn't consider this ok unless you know you have interior-pointers.
(Note: This mapping of the nine possible cases onto four leak kinds is not necessarily the best way that leaks could be reported; in particular, interior-pointers are treated inconsistently. It is possible the categorisation may be improved in the future.)
Furthermore, if suppressions exists for a block, it will be reported as "suppressed" no matter what which of the above four kinds it belongs to.
The following is an example leak summary.
LEAK SUMMARY:
definitely lost: 48 bytes in 3 blocks.
indirectly lost: 32 bytes in 2 blocks.
possibly lost: 96 bytes in 6 blocks.
still reachable: 64 bytes in 4 blocks.
suppressed: 0 bytes in 0 blocks.
If heuristics have been used to consider some blocks as reachable, the leak summary details the heuristically reachable subset of 'still reachable:' per heuristic. In the below example, of the 95 bytes still reachable, 87 bytes (56+7+8+16) have been considered heuristically reachable.
LEAK SUMMARY:
definitely lost: 4 bytes in 1 blocks
indirectly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
possibly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
still reachable: 95 bytes in 6 blocks
of which reachable via heuristic:
stdstring : 56 bytes in 2 blocks
length64 : 16 bytes in 1 blocks
newarray : 7 bytes in 1 blocks
multipleinheritance: 8 bytes in 1 blocks
suppressed: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
If --leak-check=full is specified,
Memcheck will give details for each definitely lost or possibly lost block,
including where it was allocated. (Actually, it merges results for all
blocks that have the same leak kind and sufficiently similar stack traces
into a single "loss record". The
--leak-resolution lets you control the
meaning of "sufficiently similar".) It cannot tell you when or how or why
the pointer to a leaked block was lost; you have to work that out for
yourself. In general, you should attempt to ensure your programs do not
have any definitely lost or possibly lost blocks at exit.
For example:
8 bytes in 1 blocks are definitely lost in loss record 1 of 14 at 0x........: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:...) by 0x........: mk (leak-tree.c:11) by 0x........: main (leak-tree.c:39) 88 (8 direct, 80 indirect) bytes in 1 blocks are definitely lost in loss record 13 of 14 at 0x........: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:...) by 0x........: mk (leak-tree.c:11) by 0x........: main (leak-tree.c:25)
The first message describes a simple case of a single 8 byte block that has been definitely lost. The second case mentions another 8 byte block that has been definitely lost; the difference is that a further 80 bytes in other blocks are indirectly lost because of this lost block. The loss records are not presented in any notable order, so the loss record numbers aren't particularly meaningful. The loss record numbers can be used in the Valgrind gdbserver to list the addresses of the leaked blocks and/or give more details about how a block is still reachable.
The option --show-leak-kinds=<set>
controls the set of leak kinds to show
when --leak-check=full is specified.
The <set> of leak kinds is specified
in one of the following ways:
a comma separated list of one or more of
definite indirect possible reachable.
all to specify the complete set (all leak kinds).
none for the empty set.
The default value for the leak kinds to show is
--show-leak-kinds=definite,possible.
To also show the reachable and indirectly lost blocks in
addition to the definitely and possibly lost blocks, you can
use --show-leak-kinds=all. To only show the
reachable and indirectly lost blocks, use
--show-leak-kinds=indirect,reachable. The reachable
and indirectly lost blocks will then be presented as shown in
the following two examples.
64 bytes in 4 blocks are still reachable in loss record 2 of 4 at 0x........: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:177) by 0x........: mk (leak-cases.c:52) by 0x........: main (leak-cases.c:74) 32 bytes in 2 blocks are indirectly lost in loss record 1 of 4 at 0x........: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:177) by 0x........: mk (leak-cases.c:52) by 0x........: main (leak-cases.c:80)
Because there are different kinds of leaks with different severities, an interesting question is: which leaks should be counted as true "errors" and which should not?
The answer to this question affects the numbers printed in
the ERROR SUMMARY line, and also the
effect of the --error-exitcode option. First, a leak
is only counted as a true "error"
if --leak-check=full is specified. Then, the
option --errors-for-leak-kinds=<set> controls
the set of leak kinds to consider as errors. The default value
is --errors-for-leak-kinds=definite,possible
--leak-check=<no|summary|yes|full> [default: summary]
When enabled, search for memory leaks when the client
program finishes. If set to summary, it says how
many leaks occurred. If set to full or
yes, each individual leak will be shown
in detail and/or counted as an error, as specified by the options
--show-leak-kinds and
--errors-for-leak-kinds.
If --xml=yes is given, memcheck will
automatically use the value --leak-check=full.
You can use --show-leak-kinds=none to reduce
the size of the xml output if you are not interested in the leak
results.
--leak-resolution=<low|med|high> [default: high]
When doing leak checking, determines how willing
Memcheck is to consider different backtraces to
be the same for the purposes of merging multiple leaks into a single
leak report. When set to low, only the first
two entries need match. When med, four entries
have to match. When high, all entries need to
match.
For hardcore leak debugging, you probably want to use
--leak-resolution=high together with
--num-callers=40 or some such large number.
Note that the --leak-resolution setting
does not affect Memcheck's ability to find
leaks. It only changes how the results are presented.
--show-leak-kinds=<set> [default: definite,possible]
Specifies the leak kinds to show in a full
leak search, in one of the following ways:
a comma separated list of one or more of
definite indirect possible reachable.
all to specify the complete set (all leak kinds).
It is equivalent to
--show-leak-kinds=definite,indirect,possible,reachable.
none for the empty set.
--errors-for-leak-kinds=<set> [default: definite,possible]
Specifies the leak kinds to count as errors in a
full leak search. The
<set> is specified similarly to
--show-leak-kinds
--leak-check-heuristics=<set> [default: all]
Specifies the set of leak check heuristics to be used during leak searches. The heuristics control which interior pointers to a block cause it to be considered as reachable. The heuristic set is specified in one of the following ways:
a comma separated list of one or more of
stdstring length64 newarray multipleinheritance.
all to activate the complete set of
heuristics.
It is equivalent to
--leak-check-heuristics=stdstring,length64,newarray,multipleinheritance.
none for the empty set.
Note that these heuristics are dependent on the layout of the objects produced by the C++ compiler. They have been tested with some gcc versions (e.g. 4.4 and 4.7). They might not work properly with other C++ compilers.
--show-reachable=<yes|no>
,
--show-possibly-lost=<yes|no>
These options provide an alternative way to specify the leak kinds to show:
--show-reachable=no --show-possibly-lost=yes is equivalent to
--show-leak-kinds=definite,possible.
--show-reachable=no --show-possibly-lost=no is equivalent to
--show-leak-kinds=definite.
--show-reachable=yes is equivalent to
--show-leak-kinds=all.
Note that --show-possibly-lost=no has no
effect if --show-reachable=yes is
specified.
--xtree-leak=<no|yes> [no]
If set to yes, the results for the leak search done at exit will be
output in a 'Callgrind Format' execution tree file. Note that this
automatically sets the options --leak-check=full
and --show-leak-kinds=all, to allow
xtree visualisation tools such as kcachegrind to select what kind
to leak to visualize.
The produced file will contain the following events:
RB : Reachable Bytes
PB : Possibly lost Bytes
IB : Indirectly lost Bytes
DB : Definitely lost Bytes (direct plus indirect)
DIB : Definitely Indirectly lost Bytes (subset of DB)
RBk : reachable Blocks
PBk : Possibly lost Blocks
IBk : Indirectly lost Blocks
DBk : Definitely lost Blocks
The increase or decrease for all events above will also be output in
the file to provide the delta (increase or decrease) between 2
successive leak searches. For example, iRB is the
increase of the RB event, dPBk is the
decrease of PBk event. The values for the increase and
decrease events will be zero for the first leak search done.
See Execution Trees for a detailed explanation about execution trees.
--xtree-leak-file=<filename> [default:
xtleak.kcg.%p]
Specifies that Valgrind should produce the xtree leak
report in the specified file. Any %p,
%q or %n sequences appearing in
the filename are expanded
in exactly the same way as they are for --log-file.
See the description of --log-file
for details.
See Execution Trees for a detailed explanation about execution trees formats.
--undef-value-errors=<yes|no> [default: yes]
Controls whether Memcheck reports
uses of undefined value errors. Set this to
no if you don't want to see undefined value
errors. It also has the side effect of speeding up Memcheck somewhat.
AddrCheck (removed in Valgrind 3.1.0) functioned like Memcheck with
--undef-value-errors=no.
--track-origins=<yes|no> [default: no]
Controls whether Memcheck tracks the origin of uninitialised values. By default, it does not, which means that although it can tell you that an uninitialised value is being used in a dangerous way, it cannot tell you where the uninitialised value came from. This often makes it difficult to track down the root problem.
When set
to yes, Memcheck keeps
track of the origins of all uninitialised values. Then, when
an uninitialised value error is
reported, Memcheck will try to show the
origin of the value. An origin can be one of the following
four places: a heap block, a stack allocation, a client
request, or miscellaneous other sources (eg, a call
to brk).
For uninitialised values originating from a heap block, Memcheck shows where the block was allocated. For uninitialised values originating from a stack allocation, Memcheck can tell you which function allocated the value, but no more than that -- typically it shows you the source location of the opening brace of the function. So you should carefully check that all of the function's local variables are initialised properly.
Performance overhead: origin tracking is expensive. It halves Memcheck's speed and increases memory use by a minimum of 100MB, and possibly more. Nevertheless it can drastically reduce the effort required to identify the root cause of uninitialised value errors, and so is often a programmer productivity win, despite running more slowly.
Accuracy: Memcheck tracks origins quite accurately. To avoid very large space and time overheads, some approximations are made. It is possible, although unlikely, that Memcheck will report an incorrect origin, or not be able to identify any origin.
Note that the combination
--track-origins=yes
and --undef-value-errors=no is
nonsensical. Memcheck checks for and
rejects this combination at startup.
--partial-loads-ok=<yes|no> [default: yes]
Controls how Memcheck handles 32-, 64-, 128- and 256-bit
naturally aligned loads from addresses for which some bytes are
addressable and others are not. When yes, such
loads do not produce an address error. Instead, loaded bytes
originating from illegal addresses are marked as uninitialised, and
those corresponding to legal addresses are handled in the normal
way.
When no, loads from partially invalid
addresses are treated the same as loads from completely invalid
addresses: an illegal-address error is issued, and the resulting
bytes are marked as initialised.
Note that code that behaves in this way is in violation of the ISO C/C++ standards, and should be considered broken. If at all possible, such code should be fixed.
--expensive-definedness-checks=<no|auto|yes> [default: auto]
Controls whether Memcheck should employ more precise but also more expensive (time consuming) instrumentation when checking the definedness of certain values. In particular, this affects the instrumentation of integer adds, subtracts and equality comparisons.
Selecting --expensive-definedness-checks=yes
causes Memcheck to use the most accurate analysis possible. This
minimises false error rates but can cause up to 30% performance
degradation.
Selecting --expensive-definedness-checks=no
causes Memcheck to use the cheapest instrumentation possible. This
maximises performance but will normally give an unusably high false
error rate.
The default
setting, --expensive-definedness-checks=auto, is
strongly recommended. This causes Memcheck to use the minimum of
expensive instrumentation needed to achieve the same false error
rate as --expensive-definedness-checks=yes. It
also enables an instrumentation-time analysis pass which aims to
further reduce the costs of accurate instrumentation. Overall, the
performance loss is generally around 5% relative to
--expensive-definedness-checks=no, although this is
strongly workload dependent. Note that the exact instrumentation
settings in this mode are architecture dependent.
--keep-stacktraces=alloc|free|alloc-and-free|alloc-then-free|none [default: alloc-and-free]
Controls which stack trace(s) to keep for malloc'd and/or free'd blocks.
With alloc-then-free, a stack trace is
recorded at allocation time, and is associated with the block.
When the block is freed, a second stack trace is recorded, and
this replaces the allocation stack trace. As a result, any "use
after free" errors relating to this block can only show a stack
trace for where the block was freed.
With alloc-and-free, both allocation
and the deallocation stack traces for the block are stored.
Hence a "use after free" error will
show both, which may make the error easier to diagnose.
Compared to alloc-then-free, this setting
slightly increases Valgrind's memory use as the block contains two
references instead of one.
With alloc, only the allocation stack
trace is recorded (and reported). With free,
only the deallocation stack trace is recorded (and reported).
These values somewhat decrease Valgrind's memory and cpu usage.
They can be useful depending on the error types you are
searching for and the level of detail you need to analyse
them. For example, if you are only interested in memory leak
errors, it is sufficient to record the allocation stack traces.
With none, no stack traces are recorded
for malloc and free operations. If your program allocates a lot
of blocks and/or allocates/frees from many different stack
traces, this can significantly decrease cpu and/or memory
required. Of course, few details will be reported for errors
related to heap blocks.
Note that once a stack trace is recorded, Valgrind keeps
the stack trace in memory even if it is not referenced by any
block. Some programs (for example, recursive algorithms) can
generate a huge number of stack traces. If Valgrind uses too
much memory in such circumstances, you can reduce the memory
required with the options --keep-stacktraces
and/or by using a smaller value for the
option --num-callers.
If you want to use
--xtree-memory=full memory profiling
(see Execution Trees), then you cannot
specify --keep-stacktraces=free
or --keep-stacktraces=none.
--freelist-vol=<number> [default: 20000000]
When the client program releases memory using
free (in C) or
delete
(C++), that memory is not immediately made
available for re-allocation. Instead, it is marked inaccessible
and placed in a queue of freed blocks. The purpose is to defer as
long as possible the point at which freed-up memory comes back
into circulation. This increases the chance that
Memcheck will be able to detect invalid
accesses to blocks for some significant period of time after they
have been freed.
This option specifies the maximum total size, in bytes, of the blocks in the queue. The default value is twenty million bytes. Increasing this increases the total amount of memory used by Memcheck but may detect invalid uses of freed blocks which would otherwise go undetected.
--freelist-big-blocks=<number> [default: 1000000]
When making blocks from the queue of freed blocks available
for re-allocation, Memcheck will in priority re-circulate the blocks
with a size greater or equal to --freelist-big-blocks.
This ensures that freeing big blocks (in particular freeing blocks bigger than
--freelist-vol) does not immediately lead to a re-circulation
of all (or a lot of) the small blocks in the free list. In other words,
this option increases the likelihood to discover dangling pointers
for the "small" blocks, even when big blocks are freed.
Setting a value of 0 means that all the blocks are re-circulated in a FIFO order.
--workaround-gcc296-bugs=<yes|no> [default: no]
When enabled, assume that reads and writes some small distance below the stack pointer are due to bugs in GCC 2.96, and does not report them. The "small distance" is 256 bytes by default. Note that GCC 2.96 is the default compiler on some ancient Linux distributions (RedHat 7.X) and so you may need to use this option. Do not use it if you do not have to, as it can cause real errors to be overlooked. A better alternative is to use a more recent GCC in which this bug is fixed.
You may also need to use this option when working with GCC 3.X or 4.X on 32-bit PowerPC Linux. This is because GCC generates code which occasionally accesses below the stack pointer, particularly for floating-point to/from integer conversions. This is in violation of the 32-bit PowerPC ELF specification, which makes no provision for locations below the stack pointer to be accessible.
This option is deprecated as of version 3.12 and may be
removed from future versions. You should instead use
--ignore-range-below-sp to specify the exact
range of offsets below the stack pointer that should be ignored.
A suitable equivalent
is --ignore-range-below-sp=1024-1.
--ignore-range-below-sp=<number>-<number>
This is a more general replacement for the deprecated
--workaround-gcc296-bugs option. When
specified, it causes Memcheck not to report errors for accesses
at the specified offsets below the stack pointer. The two
offsets must be positive decimal numbers and -- somewhat
counterintuitively -- the first one must be larger, in order to
imply a non-wraparound address range to ignore. For example,
to ignore 4 byte accesses at 8192 bytes below the stack
pointer,
use --ignore-range-below-sp=8192-8189. Only
one range may be specified.
--show-mismatched-frees=<yes|no> [default: yes]
When enabled, Memcheck checks that heap blocks are
deallocated using a function that matches the allocating
function. That is, it expects free to be
used to deallocate blocks allocated
by malloc, delete for
blocks allocated by new,
and delete[] for blocks allocated
by new[]. If a mismatch is detected, an
error is reported. This is in general important because in some
environments, freeing with a non-matching function can cause
crashes.
There is however a scenario where such mismatches cannot
be avoided. That is when the user provides implementations of
new/new[] that
call malloc and
of delete/delete[] that
call free, and these functions are
asymmetrically inlined. For example, imagine
that delete[] is inlined
but new[] is not. The result is that
Memcheck "sees" all delete[] calls as direct
calls to free, even when the program source
contains no mismatched calls.
This causes a lot of confusing and irrelevant error
reports. --show-mismatched-frees=no disables
these checks. It is not generally advisable to disable them,
though, because you may miss real errors as a result.
--show-realloc-size-zero=<yes|no> [default: yes]
When enabled, Memcheck checks for uses of realloc with a size of zero.
This usage of realloc is unsafe since it is not portable. On some systems it
will behave like free. On other systems it will either do nothing or else
behave like a call to free followed by a call to malloc
with a size of zero.
--ignore-ranges=0xPP-0xQQ[,0xRR-0xSS]
Any ranges listed in this option (and multiple ranges can be specified, separated by commas) will be ignored by Memcheck's addressability checking.
--malloc-fill=<hexnumber>
Fills blocks allocated
by malloc,
new, etc, but not
by calloc, with the specified
byte. This can be useful when trying to shake out obscure
memory corruption problems. The allocated area is still
regarded by Memcheck as undefined -- this option only affects its
contents. Note that --malloc-fill does not
affect a block of memory when it is used as argument
to client requests VALGRIND_MEMPOOL_ALLOC or
VALGRIND_MALLOCLIKE_BLOCK.
--free-fill=<hexnumber>
Fills blocks freed
by free,
delete, etc, with the
specified byte value. This can be useful when trying to shake out
obscure memory corruption problems. The freed area is still
regarded by Memcheck as not valid for access -- this option only
affects its contents. Note that --free-fill does not
affect a block of memory when it is used as argument to
client requests VALGRIND_MEMPOOL_FREE or VALGRIND_FREELIKE_BLOCK.
The basic suppression format is described in Suppressing errors.
The suppression-type (second) line should have the form:
Memcheck:suppression_type
The Memcheck suppression types are as follows:
Value1,
Value2,
Value4,
Value8,
Value16,
meaning an uninitialised-value error when
using a value of 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16 bytes.
Cond (or its old
name, Value0), meaning use
of an uninitialised CPU condition code.
Addr1,
Addr2,
Addr4,
Addr8,
Addr16,
meaning an invalid address during a
memory access of 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16 bytes respectively.
Jump, meaning an
jump to an unaddressable location error.
Param, meaning an
invalid system call parameter error.
Free, meaning an
invalid or mismatching free.
Overlap, meaning a
src /
dst overlap in
memcpy or a similar function.
Leak, meaning
a memory leak.
Param errors have a mandatory extra
information line at this point, which is the name of the offending
system call parameter.
Leak errors have an optional
extra information line, with the following format:
match-leak-kinds:<set>
where <set> specifies which
leak kinds are matched by this suppression entry.
<set> is specified in the
same way as with the option --show-leak-kinds, that is,
one of the following:
a comma separated list of one or more of
definite indirect possible reachable.
all to specify the complete set
(all leak kinds).
none for the empty set.
If this optional extra line is not present, the suppression entry will match all leak kinds.
Be aware that leak suppressions that are created using
--gen-suppressions will contain this optional extra
line, and therefore may match fewer leaks than you expect. You may
want to remove the line before using the generated
suppressions.
The other Memcheck error kinds do not have extra lines.
If you give the -v option, Valgrind will print
the list of used suppressions at the end of execution.
For a leak suppression, this output gives the number of different
loss records that match the suppression, and the number of bytes
and blocks suppressed by the suppression.
If the run contains multiple leak checks, the number of bytes and blocks
are reset to zero before each new leak check. Note that the number of different
loss records is not reset to zero.
In the example below, in the last leak search, 7 blocks and 96 bytes have
been suppressed by a suppression with the name
some_leak_suppression:
--21041-- used_suppression: 10 some_other_leak_suppression s.supp:14 suppressed: 12,400 bytes in 1 blocks --21041-- used_suppression: 39 some_leak_suppression s.supp:2 suppressed: 96 bytes in 7 blocks
For ValueN and AddrN
errors, the first line of the calling context is either the name of
the function in which the error occurred, or, failing that, the full
path of the .so file or executable containing the
error location. For Free errors, the first line is
the name of the function doing the freeing (eg,
free, __builtin_vec_delete,
etc). For Overlap errors, the first line is the name of the
function with the overlapping arguments (eg.
memcpy, strcpy, etc).
The last part of any suppression specifies the rest of the calling context that needs to be matched.
Read this section if you want to know, in detail, exactly what and how Memcheck is checking.
It is simplest to think of Memcheck implementing a synthetic CPU which is identical to a real CPU, except for one crucial detail. Every bit (literally) of data processed, stored and handled by the real CPU has, in the synthetic CPU, an associated "valid-value" bit, which says whether or not the accompanying bit has a legitimate value. In the discussions which follow, this bit is referred to as the V (valid-value) bit.
Each byte in the system therefore has a 8 V bits which follow it wherever it goes. For example, when the CPU loads a word-size item (4 bytes) from memory, it also loads the corresponding 32 V bits from a bitmap which stores the V bits for the process' entire address space. If the CPU should later write the whole or some part of that value to memory at a different address, the relevant V bits will be stored back in the V-bit bitmap.
In short, each bit in the system has (conceptually) an associated V bit, which follows it around everywhere, even inside the CPU. Yes, all the CPU's registers (integer, floating point, vector and condition registers) have their own V bit vectors. For this to work, Memcheck uses a great deal of compression to represent the V bits compactly.
Copying values around does not cause Memcheck to check for, or report on, errors. However, when a value is used in a way which might conceivably affect your program's externally-visible behaviour, the associated V bits are immediately checked. If any of these indicate that the value is undefined (even partially), an error is reported.
Here's an (admittedly nonsensical) example:
int i, j;
int a[10], b[10];
for ( i = 0; i < 10; i++ ) {
j = a[i];
b[i] = j;
}
Memcheck emits no complaints about this, since it merely copies
uninitialised values from a[] into
b[], and doesn't use them in a way which could
affect the behaviour of the program. However, if
the loop is changed to:
for ( i = 0; i < 10; i++ ) {
j += a[i];
}
if ( j == 77 )
printf("hello there\n");
then Memcheck will complain, at the
if, that the condition depends on
uninitialised values. Note that it doesn't complain
at the j += a[i];, since at that point the
undefinedness is not "observable". It's only when a decision has to be
made as to whether or not to do the printf -- an
observable action of your program -- that Memcheck complains.
Most low level operations, such as adds, cause Memcheck to use the V bits for the operands to calculate the V bits for the result. Even if the result is partially or wholly undefined, it does not complain.
Checks on definedness only occur in three places: when a value is used to generate a memory address, when control flow decision needs to be made, and when a system call is detected, Memcheck checks definedness of parameters as required.
If a check should detect undefinedness, an error message is issued. The resulting value is subsequently regarded as well-defined. To do otherwise would give long chains of error messages. In other words, once Memcheck reports an undefined value error, it tries to avoid reporting further errors derived from that same undefined value.
This sounds overcomplicated. Why not just check all reads from memory, and complain if an undefined value is loaded into a CPU register? Well, that doesn't work well, because perfectly legitimate C programs routinely copy uninitialised values around in memory, and we don't want endless complaints about that. Here's the canonical example. Consider a struct like this:
struct S { int x; char c; };
struct S s1, s2;
s1.x = 42;
s1.c = 'z';
s2 = s1;
The question to ask is: how large is struct S,
in bytes? An int is 4 bytes and a
char one byte, so perhaps a struct
S occupies 5 bytes? Wrong. All non-toy compilers we know
of will round the size of struct S up to a whole
number of words, in this case 8 bytes. Not doing this forces compilers
to generate truly appalling code for accessing arrays of
struct S's on some architectures.
So s1 occupies 8 bytes, yet only 5 of them will
be initialised. For the assignment s2 = s1, GCC
generates code to copy all 8 bytes wholesale into s2
without regard for their meaning. If Memcheck simply checked values as
they came out of memory, it would yelp every time a structure assignment
like this happened. So the more complicated behaviour described above
is necessary. This allows GCC to copy
s1 into s2 any way it likes, and a
warning will only be emitted if the uninitialised values are later
used.
As explained above, Memcheck maintains 8 V bits for each byte in your
process, including for bytes that are in shared memory. However, the same piece
of shared memory can be mapped multiple times, by several processes or even by
the same process (for example, if the process wants a read-only and a read-write
mapping of the same page). For such multiple mappings, Memcheck tracks the V
bits for each mapping independently. This can lead to false positive errors, as
the shared memory can be initialised via a first mapping, and accessed via
another mapping. The access via this other mapping will have its own V bits,
which have not been changed when the memory was initialised via the first
mapping. The bypass for these false positives is to use Memcheck's client
requests VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED and
VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED to inform
Memcheck about what your program does (or what another process does)
to these shared memory mappings.
Notice that the previous subsection describes how the validity of values is established and maintained without having to say whether the program does or does not have the right to access any particular memory location. We now consider the latter question.
As described above, every bit in memory or in the CPU has an associated valid-value (V) bit. In addition, all bytes in memory, but not in the CPU, have an associated valid-address (A) bit. This indicates whether or not the program can legitimately read or write that location. It does not give any indication of the validity of the data at that location -- that's the job of the V bits -- only whether or not the location may be accessed.
Every time your program reads or writes memory, Memcheck checks the A bits associated with the address. If any of them indicate an invalid address, an error is emitted. Note that the reads and writes themselves do not change the A bits, only consult them.
So how do the A bits get set/cleared? Like this:
When the program starts, all the global data areas are marked as accessible.
When the program does
malloc/new,
the A bits for exactly the area allocated, and not a byte more,
are marked as accessible. Upon freeing the area the A bits are
changed to indicate inaccessibility.
When the stack pointer register (SP) moves
up or down, A bits are set. The rule is that the area from
SP up to the base of the stack is marked as
accessible, and below SP is inaccessible. (If
that sounds illogical, bear in mind that the stack grows down, not
up, on almost all Unix systems, including GNU/Linux.) Tracking
SP like this has the useful side-effect that the
section of stack used by a function for local variables etc is
automatically marked accessible on function entry and inaccessible
on exit.
When doing system calls, A bits are changed appropriately.
For example, mmap
magically makes files appear in the process'
address space, so the A bits must be updated if mmap
succeeds.
Optionally, your program can tell Memcheck about such changes explicitly, using the client request mechanism described above.
Memcheck's checking machinery can be summarised as follows:
Each byte in memory has 8 associated V (valid-value) bits, saying whether or not the byte has a defined value, and a single A (valid-address) bit, saying whether or not the program currently has the right to read/write that address. As mentioned above, heavy use of compression means the overhead is typically around 25%.
When memory is read or written, the relevant A bits are consulted. If they indicate an invalid address, Memcheck emits an Invalid read or Invalid write error.
When memory is read into the CPU's registers, the relevant V bits are fetched from memory and stored in the simulated CPU. They are not consulted.
When a register is written out to memory, the V bits for that register are written back to memory too.
When values in CPU registers are used to generate a memory address, or to determine the outcome of a conditional branch, the V bits for those values are checked, and an error emitted if any of them are undefined.
When values in CPU registers are used for any other purpose, Memcheck computes the V bits for the result, but does not check them.
Once the V bits for a value in the CPU have been checked, they are then set to indicate validity. This avoids long chains of errors.
When values are loaded from memory, Memcheck checks the A bits for that location and issues an illegal-address warning if needed. In that case, the V bits loaded are forced to indicate Valid, despite the location being invalid.
This apparently strange choice reduces the amount of confusing information presented to the user. It avoids the unpleasant phenomenon in which memory is read from a place which is both unaddressable and contains invalid values, and, as a result, you get not only an invalid-address (read/write) error, but also a potentially large set of uninitialised-value errors, one for every time the value is used.
There is a hazy boundary case to do with multi-byte loads from
addresses which are partially valid and partially invalid. See
details of the option --partial-loads-ok for details.
Memcheck intercepts calls to malloc,
calloc, realloc,
valloc, memalign,
free, new,
new[],
delete and
delete[]. The behaviour you get
is:
malloc/new/new[]:
the returned memory is marked as addressable but not having valid
values. This means you have to write to it before you can read
it.
calloc: returned memory is marked both
addressable and valid, since calloc clears
the area to zero.
realloc: if the new size is larger than
the old, the new section is addressable but invalid, as with
malloc. If the new size is smaller, the
dropped-off section is marked as unaddressable. You may only pass to
realloc a pointer previously issued to you by
malloc/calloc/realloc.
free/delete/delete[]:
you may only pass to these functions a pointer previously issued
to you by the corresponding allocation function. Otherwise,
Memcheck complains. If the pointer is indeed valid, Memcheck
marks the entire area it points at as unaddressable, and places
the block in the freed-blocks-queue. The aim is to defer as long
as possible reallocation of this block. Until that happens, all
attempts to access it will elicit an invalid-address error, as you
would hope.
The Memcheck tool provides monitor commands handled by Valgrind's built-in
gdbserver (see Monitor command handling by the Valgrind gdbserver).
Valgrind python code provides GDB front end commands giving an easier usage of
the memcheck monitor commands (see
GDB front end commands for Valgrind gdbserver monitor commands). To launch a
memcheck monitor command via its GDB front end command, instead of prefixing
the command with "monitor", you must use the GDB memcheck
command (or the shorter aliases mc). Using the memcheck
GDB front end command provide a more flexible usage, such as evaluation of
address and length arguments by GDB. In GDB, you can use help
memcheck to get help about the memcheck front end monitor commands
and you can use apropos memcheck to get all the commands
mentionning the word "memcheck" in their name or on-line help.
xb <addr> [<len>]
shows the definedness (V) bits and values for <len> (default 1)
bytes starting at <addr>.
For each 8 bytes, two lines are output.
The first line shows the validity bits for 8 bytes.
The definedness of each byte in the range is given using two hexadecimal
digits. These hexadecimal digits encode the validity of each bit of the
corresponding byte,
using 0 if the bit is defined and 1 if the bit is undefined.
If a byte is not addressable, its validity bits are replaced
by __ (a double underscore).
The second line shows the values of the bytes below the corresponding validity bits. The format used to show the bytes data is similar to the GDB command 'x /<len>xb <addr>'. The value for a non addressable bytes is shown as ?? (two question marks).
In the following example, string10 is an array
of 10 characters, in which the even numbered bytes are
undefined. In the below example, the byte corresponding
to string10[5] is not addressable.
(gdb) p &string10
$4 = (char (*)[10]) 0x804a2f0
(gdb) mo xb 0x804a2f0 10
ff 00 ff 00 ff __ ff 00
0x804A2F0: 0x3f 0x6e 0x3f 0x65 0x3f 0x?? 0x3f 0x65
ff 00
0x804A2F8: 0x3f 0x00
Address 0x804A2F0 len 10 has 1 bytes unaddressable
(gdb)
The GDB memcheck front end command memcheck xb ADDR
[LEN] accepts any address expression for its first ADDR
argument. The second optional argument is any integer expression. Note
that these 2 arguments must be separated by a space.
The following example shows how to get the definedness of
string10 using the memcheck xb front end command.
(gdb) mc xb &string10 sizeof(string10)
ff 00 ff 00 ff __ ff 00
0x804A2F0: 0x3f 0x6e 0x3f 0x65 0x3f 0x?? 0x3f 0x65
ff 00
0x804A2F8: 0x3f 0x00
Address 0x804A2F0 len 10 has 1 bytes unaddressable
(gdb)
The command xb cannot be used with registers. To get
the validity bits of a register, you must start Valgrind with the
option --vgdb-shadow-registers=yes. The validity
bits of a register can then be obtained by printing the 'shadow 1'
corresponding register. In the below x86 example, the register
eax has all its bits undefined, while the register ebx is fully
defined.
(gdb) p /x $eaxs1 $9 = 0xffffffff (gdb) p /x $ebxs1 $10 = 0x0 (gdb)
get_vbits <addr> [<len>]
shows the definedness (V) bits for <len> (default 1) bytes
starting at <addr> using the same convention as the
xb command. get_vbits only
shows the V bits (grouped by 4 bytes). It does not show the values.
If you want to associate V bits with the corresponding byte values, the
xb command will be easier to use, in particular
on little endian computers when associating undefined parts of an integer
with their V bits values.
The following example shows the result of get_vbits on
the string10 used in the xb command
explanation. The GDB memcheck equivalent front end command memcheck
get_vbits ADDR [LEN]accepts any ADDR expression and any LEN
expression (separated by a space).
(gdb) monitor get_vbits 0x804a2f0 10 ff00ff00 ff__ff00 ff00 Address 0x804A2F0 len 10 has 1 bytes unaddressable (gdb) memcheck get_vbits &string10 sizeof(string10) ff00ff00 ff__ff00 ff00 Address 0x804A2F0 len 10 has 1 bytes unaddressable
make_memory
[noaccess|undefined|defined|Definedifaddressable] <addr>
[<len>] marks the range of <len> (default 1)
bytes at <addr> as having the given status. Parameter
noaccess marks the range as non-accessible, so
Memcheck will report an error on any access to it.
undefined or defined mark
the area as accessible, but Memcheck regards the bytes in it
respectively as having undefined or defined values.
Definedifaddressable marks as defined, bytes in
the range which are already addressible, but makes no change to
the status of bytes in the range which are not addressible. Note
that the first letter of Definedifaddressable
is an uppercase D to avoid confusion with defined.
The GDB equivalent memcheck front end commands memcheck
make_memory [noaccess|undefined|defined|Definedifaddressable] ADDR
[LEN] accept any address expression for their first ADDR
argument. The second optional argument is any integer expression. Note
that these 2 arguments must be separated by a space.
In the following example, the first byte of the
string10 is marked as defined and then is marked
noaccess:
(gdb) monitor make_memory defined 0x8049e28 1 (gdb) monitor get_vbits 0x8049e28 10 0000ff00 ff00ff00 ff00 (gdb) memcheck make_memory noaccess &string10[0] (gdb) memcheck get_vbits &string10 sizeof(string10) __00ff00 ff00ff00 ff00 Address 0x8049E28 len 10 has 1 bytes unaddressable (gdb)
check_memory [addressable|defined] <addr>
[<len>] checks that the range of <len>
(default 1) bytes at <addr> has the specified accessibility.
It then outputs a description of <addr>. In the following
example, a detailed description is available because the
option --read-var-info=yes was given at Valgrind
startup:
(gdb) monitor check_memory defined 0x8049e28 1 Address 0x8049E28 len 1 defined ==14698== Location 0x8049e28 is 0 bytes inside string10[0], ==14698== declared at prog.c:10, in frame #0 of thread 1 (gdb)
The GDB equivalent memcheck front end commands memcheck
check_memory [addressable|defined] ADDR [LEN] accept any address
expression for their first ADDR argument. The second optional argument is
any integer expression. Note that these 2 arguments must be separated by a
space.
leak_check [full*|summary|xtleak]
[kinds <set>|reachable|possibleleak*|definiteleak]
[heuristics heur1,heur2,...]
[new|increased*|changed|any]
[unlimited*|limited <max_loss_records_output>]
performs a leak check. The * in the arguments
indicates the default values.
If the [full*|summary|xtleak] argument is
summary, only a summary of the leak search is given;
otherwise a full leak report is produced. A full leak report gives
detailed information for each leak: the stack trace where the leaked blocks
were allocated, the number of blocks leaked and their total size. When a
full report is requested, the next two arguments further specify what
kind of leaks to report. A leak's details are shown if they match
both the second and third argument. A full leak report might
output detailed information for many leaks. The nr of leaks for
which information is output can be controlled using
the limited argument followed by the maximum nr
of leak records to output. If this maximum is reached, the leak
search outputs the records with the biggest number of bytes.
The value xtleak also produces a full leak report,
but output it as an xtree in a file xtleak.kcg.%p.%n (see --log-file).
See Execution Trees
for a detailed explanation about execution trees formats.
See --xtree-leak for the description of the events
in a xtree leak file.
The kinds argument controls what kind of blocks
are shown for a full leak search. The set of leak kinds
to show can be specified using a <set> similarly
to the command line option --show-leak-kinds.
Alternatively, the value definiteleak
is equivalent to kinds definite, the
value possibleleak is equivalent to
kinds definite,possible : it will also show
possibly leaked blocks, .i.e those for which only an interior
pointer was found. The value reachable will
show all block categories (i.e. is equivalent to kinds
all).
The heuristics argument controls the heuristics
used during the leak search. The set of heuristics to use can be specified
using a <set> similarly
to the command line option --leak-check-heuristics.
The default value for the heuristics argument is
heuristics none.
The [new|increased*|changed|any] argument controls
what kinds of changes are shown for a full leak search.
The value increased specifies that only block
allocation stacks with an increased number of leaked bytes or
blocks since the previous leak check should be shown. The
value changed specifies that allocation stacks
with any change since the previous leak check should be shown.
The value new specifies to show only the block
allocation stacks that are new since the previous leak search.
The value any specifies that all leak entries
should be shown, regardless of any increase or decrease.
If new or increased or
changed are specified, the leak report entries will show
the delta relative to the previous leak report and the new loss records
will have a "new" marker (even when increased or
changed were specified).
The following example shows usage of the
leak_check monitor command on
the memcheck/tests/leak-cases.c regression
test. The first command outputs one entry having an increase in
the leaked bytes. The second command is the same as the first
command, but uses the abbreviated forms accepted by GDB and the
Valgrind gdbserver. It only outputs the summary information, as
there was no increase since the previous leak search.
(gdb) monitor leak_check full possibleleak increased ==19520== 16 (+16) bytes in 1 (+1) blocks are possibly lost in new loss record 9 of 12 ==19520== at 0x40070B4: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:263) ==19520== by 0x80484D5: mk (leak-cases.c:52) ==19520== by 0x804855F: f (leak-cases.c:81) ==19520== by 0x80488E0: main (leak-cases.c:107) ==19520== ==19520== LEAK SUMMARY: ==19520== definitely lost: 32 (+0) bytes in 2 (+0) blocks ==19520== indirectly lost: 16 (+0) bytes in 1 (+0) blocks ==19520== possibly lost: 32 (+16) bytes in 2 (+1) blocks ==19520== still reachable: 96 (+16) bytes in 6 (+1) blocks ==19520== suppressed: 0 (+0) bytes in 0 (+0) blocks ==19520== Reachable blocks (those to which a pointer was found) are not shown. ==19520== To see them, add 'reachable any' args to leak_check ==19520== (gdb) mo l ==19520== LEAK SUMMARY: ==19520== definitely lost: 32 (+0) bytes in 2 (+0) blocks ==19520== indirectly lost: 16 (+0) bytes in 1 (+0) blocks ==19520== possibly lost: 32 (+0) bytes in 2 (+0) blocks ==19520== still reachable: 96 (+0) bytes in 6 (+0) blocks ==19520== suppressed: 0 (+0) bytes in 0 (+0) blocks ==19520== Reachable blocks (those to which a pointer was found) are not shown. ==19520== To see them, add 'reachable any' args to leak_check ==19520== (gdb)
Note that when using Valgrind's gdbserver, it is not
necessary to rerun
with --leak-check=full
--show-reachable=yes to see the reachable
blocks. You can obtain the same information without rerunning by
using the GDB command monitor leak_check full
reachable any (or, using
abbreviation: mo l f r a).
The GDB equivalent memcheck front end command memcheck
leak_check auto-completes the user input by providing the full
list of keywords still relevant according to what is already typed. For
example, if the "summary" keyword has been provided, the following TABs to
auto-complete other items will not propose anymore "full" and "xtleak".
Note that KIND and HEUR values are not part of auto-completed elements.
block_list <loss_record_nr>|<loss_record_nr_from>..<loss_record_nr_to>
[unlimited*|limited <max_blocks>]
[heuristics heur1,heur2,...]
shows the list of blocks belonging to
<loss_record_nr> (or to the loss records range
<loss_record_nr_from>..<loss_record_nr_to>).
The nr of blocks to print can be controlled using the
limited argument followed by the maximum nr
of blocks to output.
If one or more heuristics are given, only prints the loss records
and blocks found via one of the given heur1,heur2,...
heuristics.
A leak search merges the allocated blocks in loss records :
a loss record re-groups all blocks having the same state (for
example, Definitely Lost) and the same allocation backtrace.
Each loss record is identified in the leak search result
by a loss record number.
The block_list command shows the loss record information
followed by the addresses and sizes of the blocks which have been
merged in the loss record. If a block was found using an heuristic, the block size
is followed by the heuristic.
If a directly lost block causes some other blocks to be indirectly lost, the block_list command will also show these indirectly lost blocks. The indirectly lost blocks will be indented according to the level of indirection between the directly lost block and the indirectly lost block(s). Each indirectly lost block is followed by the reference of its loss record.
The block_list command can be used on the results of a leak search as long as no block has been freed after this leak search: as soon as the program frees a block, a new leak search is needed before block_list can be used again.
In the below example, the program leaks a tree structure by losing the pointer to the block A (top of the tree). So, the block A is directly lost, causing an indirect loss of blocks B to G. The first block_list command shows the loss record of A (a definitely lost block with address 0x4028028, size 16). The addresses and sizes of the indirectly lost blocks due to block A are shown below the block A. The second command shows the details of one of the indirect loss records output by the first command.
A
/ \
B C
/ \ / \
D E F G
(gdb) bt #0 main () at leak-tree.c:69 (gdb) monitor leak_check full any ==19552== 112 (16 direct, 96 indirect) bytes in 1 blocks are definitely lost in loss record 7 of 7 ==19552== at 0x40070B4: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:263) ==19552== by 0x80484D5: mk (leak-tree.c:28) ==19552== by 0x80484FC: f (leak-tree.c:41) ==19552== by 0x8048856: main (leak-tree.c:63) ==19552== ==19552== LEAK SUMMARY: ==19552== definitely lost: 16 bytes in 1 blocks ==19552== indirectly lost: 96 bytes in 6 blocks ==19552== possibly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==19552== still reachable: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==19552== suppressed: 0 bytes in 0 blocks ==19552== (gdb) monitor block_list 7 ==19552== 112 (16 direct, 96 indirect) bytes in 1 blocks are definitely lost in loss record 7 of 7 ==19552== at 0x40070B4: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:263) ==19552== by 0x80484D5: mk (leak-tree.c:28) ==19552== by 0x80484FC: f (leak-tree.c:41) ==19552== by 0x8048856: main (leak-tree.c:63) ==19552== 0x4028028[16] ==19552== 0x4028068[16] indirect loss record 1 ==19552== 0x40280E8[16] indirect loss record 3 ==19552== 0x4028128[16] indirect loss record 4 ==19552== 0x40280A8[16] indirect loss record 2 ==19552== 0x4028168[16] indirect loss record 5 ==19552== 0x40281A8[16] indirect loss record 6 (gdb) mo b 2 ==19552== 16 bytes in 1 blocks are indirectly lost in loss record 2 of 7 ==19552== at 0x40070B4: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:263) ==19552== by 0x80484D5: mk (leak-tree.c:28) ==19552== by 0x8048519: f (leak-tree.c:43) ==19552== by 0x8048856: main (leak-tree.c:63) ==19552== 0x40280A8[16] ==19552== 0x4028168[16] indirect loss record 5 ==19552== 0x40281A8[16] indirect loss record 6 (gdb)
who_points_at <addr> [<len>]
shows all the locations where a pointer to addr is found.
If len is equal to 1, the command only shows the locations pointing
exactly at addr (i.e. the "start pointers" to addr).
If len is > 1, "interior pointers" pointing at the len first bytes
will also be shown.
The locations searched for are the same as the locations
used in the leak search. So, who_points_at can a.o.
be used to show why the leak search still can reach a block, or can
search for dangling pointers to a freed block.
Each location pointing at addr (or pointing inside addr if interior pointers
are being searched for) will be described.
The GDB equivalent memcheck front end command memcheck
who_points_at ADDR [LEN] accept any address expression for its
first ADDR argument. The second optional argument is any integer
expression. Note that these 2 arguments must be separated by a space.
In the below example, the pointers to the 'tree block A' (see example
in command block_list) is shown before the tree was leaked.
The descriptions are detailed as the option --read-var-info=yes
was given at Valgrind startup. The second call shows the pointers (start and interior
pointers) to block G. The block G (0x40281A8) is reachable via block C (0x40280a8)
and register ECX of tid 1 (tid is the Valgrind thread id).
It is "interior reachable" via the register EBX.
(gdb) monitor who_points_at 0x4028028 ==20852== Searching for pointers to 0x4028028 ==20852== *0x8049e20 points at 0x4028028 ==20852== Location 0x8049e20 is 0 bytes inside global var "t" ==20852== declared at leak-tree.c:35 (gdb) monitor who_points_at 0x40281A8 16 ==20852== Searching for pointers pointing in 16 bytes from 0x40281a8 ==20852== *0x40280ac points at 0x40281a8 ==20852== Address 0x40280ac is 4 bytes inside a block of size 16 alloc'd ==20852== at 0x40070B4: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:263) ==20852== by 0x80484D5: mk (leak-tree.c:28) ==20852== by 0x8048519: f (leak-tree.c:43) ==20852== by 0x8048856: main (leak-tree.c:63) ==20852== tid 1 register ECX points at 0x40281a8 ==20852== tid 1 register EBX interior points at 2 bytes inside 0x40281a8 (gdb)
When who_points_at finds an interior pointer,
it will report the heuristic(s) with which this interior pointer
will be considered as reachable. Note that this is done independently
of the value of the option --leak-check-heuristics.
In the below example, the loss record 6 indicates a possibly lost
block. who_points_at reports that there is an interior
pointer pointing in this block, and that the block can be considered
reachable using the heuristic
multipleinheritance.
(gdb) monitor block_list 6 ==3748== 8 bytes in 1 blocks are possibly lost in loss record 6 of 7 ==3748== at 0x4007D77: operator new(unsigned int) (vg_replace_malloc.c:313) ==3748== by 0x8048954: main (leak_cpp_interior.cpp:43) ==3748== 0x402A0E0[8] (gdb) monitor who_points_at 0x402A0E0 8 ==3748== Searching for pointers pointing in 8 bytes from 0x402a0e0 ==3748== *0xbe8ee078 interior points at 4 bytes inside 0x402a0e0 ==3748== Address 0xbe8ee078 is on thread 1's stack ==3748== block at 0x402a0e0 considered reachable by ptr 0x402a0e4 using multipleinheritance heuristic (gdb)
xtmemory [<filename> default xtmemory.kcg.%p.%n]
requests Memcheck tool to produce an xtree heap memory report.
See Execution Trees for
a detailed explanation about execution trees.
The following client requests are defined in
memcheck.h.
See memcheck.h for exact details of their
arguments.
VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_NOACCESS,
VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED and
VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED.
These mark address ranges as completely inaccessible,
accessible but containing undefined data, and accessible and
containing defined data, respectively. They return -1, when
run on Valgrind and 0 otherwise.
VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED_IF_ADDRESSABLE.
This is just like VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED but only
affects those bytes that are already addressable.
VALGRIND_CHECK_MEM_IS_ADDRESSABLE and
VALGRIND_CHECK_MEM_IS_DEFINED: check immediately
whether or not the given address range has the relevant property,
and if not, print an error message. Also, for the convenience of
the client, returns zero if the relevant property holds; otherwise,
the returned value is the address of the first byte for which the
property is not true. Always returns 0 when not run on
Valgrind.
VALGRIND_CHECK_VALUE_IS_DEFINED: a quick and easy
way to find out whether Valgrind thinks a particular value
(lvalue, to be precise) is addressable and defined. Prints an error
message if not. It has no return value.
VALGRIND_DO_LEAK_CHECK: does a full memory leak
check (like --leak-check=full) right now.
This is useful for incrementally checking for leaks between arbitrary
places in the program's execution. It has no return value.
VALGRIND_DO_ADDED_LEAK_CHECK: same as
VALGRIND_DO_LEAK_CHECK but only shows the
entries for which there was an increase in leaked bytes or leaked
number of blocks since the previous leak search. It has no return
value.
VALGRIND_DO_CHANGED_LEAK_CHECK: same as
VALGRIND_DO_LEAK_CHECK but only shows the
entries for which there was an increase or decrease in leaked
bytes or leaked number of blocks since the previous leak search. It
has no return value.
VALGRIND_DO_NEW_LEAK_CHECK: same as
VALGRIND_DO_LEAK_CHECK but only shows the new
entries since the previous leak search. It has no return value.
VALGRIND_DO_QUICK_LEAK_CHECK: like
VALGRIND_DO_LEAK_CHECK, except it produces only a leak
summary (like --leak-check=summary).
It has no return value.
VALGRIND_COUNT_LEAKS: fills in the four
arguments with the number of bytes of memory found by the previous
leak check to be leaked (i.e. the sum of direct leaks and indirect leaks),
dubious, reachable and suppressed. This is useful in test harness code,
after calling VALGRIND_DO_LEAK_CHECK or
VALGRIND_DO_QUICK_LEAK_CHECK.
VALGRIND_COUNT_LEAK_BLOCKS: identical to
VALGRIND_COUNT_LEAKS except that it returns the
number of blocks rather than the number of bytes in each
category.
VALGRIND_GET_VBITS and
VALGRIND_SET_VBITS: allow you to get and set the
V (validity) bits for an address range. You should probably only
set V bits that you have got with
VALGRIND_GET_VBITS. Only for those who really
know what they are doing.
VALGRIND_CREATE_BLOCK and
VALGRIND_DISCARD. VALGRIND_CREATE_BLOCK
takes an address, a number of bytes and a character string. The
specified address range is then associated with that string. When
Memcheck reports an invalid access to an address in the range, it
will describe it in terms of this block rather than in terms of
any other block it knows about. Note that the use of this macro
does not actually change the state of memory in any way -- it
merely gives a name for the range.
At some point you may want Memcheck to stop reporting errors
in terms of the block named
by VALGRIND_CREATE_BLOCK. To make this
possible, VALGRIND_CREATE_BLOCK returns a
"block handle", which is a C int value. You
can pass this block handle to VALGRIND_DISCARD.
After doing so, Valgrind will no longer relate addressing errors
in the specified range to the block. Passing invalid handles to
VALGRIND_DISCARD is harmless.
Some programs use custom memory allocators, often for performance reasons. Left to itself, Memcheck is unable to understand the behaviour of custom allocation schemes as well as it understands the standard allocators, and so may miss errors and leaks in your program. What this section describes is a way to give Memcheck enough of a description of your custom allocator that it can make at least some sense of what is happening.
There are many different sorts of custom allocator, so Memcheck attempts to reason about them using a loose, abstract model. We use the following terminology when describing custom allocation systems:
Custom allocation involves a set of independent "memory pools".
Memcheck's notion of a a memory pool consists of a single "anchor address" and a set of non-overlapping "chunks" associated with the anchor address.
Typically a pool's anchor address is the address of a book-keeping "header" structure.
Typically the pool's chunks are drawn from a contiguous
"superblock" acquired through the system
malloc or
mmap.
Keep in mind that the last two points above say "typically": the Valgrind mempool client request API is intentionally vague about the exact structure of a mempool. There is no specific mention made of headers or superblocks. Nevertheless, the following picture may help elucidate the intention of the terms in the API:
"pool"
(anchor address)
|
v
+--------+---+
| header | o |
+--------+-|-+
|
v superblock
+------+---+--------------+---+------------------+
| |rzB| allocation |rzB| |
+------+---+--------------+---+------------------+
^ ^
| |
"addr" "addr"+"size"
Note that the header and the superblock may be contiguous or discontiguous, and there may be multiple superblocks associated with a single header; such variations are opaque to Memcheck. The API only requires that your allocation scheme can present sensible values of "pool", "addr" and "size".
Typically, before making client requests related to mempools, a client
program will have allocated such a header and superblock for their
mempool, and marked the superblock NOACCESS using the
VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_NOACCESS client request.
When dealing with mempools, the goal is to maintain a particular invariant condition: that Memcheck believes the unallocated portions of the pool's superblock (including redzones) are NOACCESS. To maintain this invariant, the client program must ensure that the superblock starts out in that state; Memcheck cannot make it so, since Memcheck never explicitly learns about the superblock of a pool, only the allocated chunks within the pool.
Once the header and superblock for a pool are established and properly marked, there are a number of client requests programs can use to inform Memcheck about changes to the state of a mempool:
VALGRIND_CREATE_MEMPOOL(pool, rzB, is_zeroed):
This request registers the address pool as the anchor
address for a memory pool. It also provides a size
rzB, specifying how large the redzones placed around
chunks allocated from the pool should be. Finally, it provides an
is_zeroed argument that specifies whether the pool's
chunks are zeroed (more precisely: defined) when allocated.
Upon completion of this request, no chunks are associated with the pool. The request simply tells Memcheck that the pool exists, so that subsequent calls can refer to it as a pool.
VALGRIND_CREATE_MEMPOOL_EXT(pool, rzB, is_zeroed, flags):
Create a memory pool with some flags (that can
be OR-ed together) specifying extended behaviour. When flags is
zero, the behaviour is identical to
VALGRIND_CREATE_MEMPOOL.
The flag VALGRIND_MEMPOOL_METAPOOL
specifies that the pieces of memory associated with the pool
using VALGRIND_MEMPOOL_ALLOC will be used
by the application as superblocks to dole out MALLOC_LIKE
blocks using VALGRIND_MALLOCLIKE_BLOCK.
In other words, a meta pool is a "2 levels" pool : first
level is the blocks described
by VALGRIND_MEMPOOL_ALLOC. The second
level blocks are described
using VALGRIND_MALLOCLIKE_BLOCK. Note
that the association between the pool and the second level
blocks is implicit : second level blocks will be located
inside first level blocks. It is necessary to use
the VALGRIND_MEMPOOL_METAPOOL flag for
such 2 levels pools, as otherwise valgrind will detect
overlapping memory blocks, and will abort execution
(e.g. during leak search).
VALGRIND_MEMPOOL_AUTO_FREE. Such a meta
pool can also be marked as an 'auto free' pool using the
flag VALGRIND_MEMPOOL_AUTO_FREE, which
must be OR-ed together with
the VALGRIND_MEMPOOL_METAPOOL. For an
'auto free' pool, VALGRIND_MEMPOOL_FREE
will automatically free the second level blocks that are
contained inside the first level block freed
with VALGRIND_MEMPOOL_FREE. In other
words, calling VALGRIND_MEMPOOL_FREE will
cause implicit calls
to VALGRIND_FREELIKE_BLOCK for all the
second level blocks included in the first level block.
Note: it is an error to use
the VALGRIND_MEMPOOL_AUTO_FREE flag
without the
VALGRIND_MEMPOOL_METAPOOL flag.
VALGRIND_DESTROY_MEMPOOL(pool):
This request tells Memcheck that a pool is being torn down. Memcheck
then removes all records of chunks associated with the pool, as well
as its record of the pool's existence. While destroying its records of
a mempool, Memcheck resets the redzones of any live chunks in the pool
to NOACCESS.
VALGRIND_MEMPOOL_ALLOC(pool, addr, size):
This request informs Memcheck that a size-byte chunk
has been allocated at addr, and associates the chunk with the
specified
pool. If the pool was created with nonzero
rzB redzones, Memcheck will mark the
rzB bytes before and after the chunk as NOACCESS. If
the pool was created with the is_zeroed argument set,
Memcheck will mark the chunk as DEFINED, otherwise Memcheck will mark
the chunk as UNDEFINED.
VALGRIND_MEMPOOL_FREE(pool, addr):
This request informs Memcheck that the chunk at addr
should no longer be considered allocated. Memcheck will mark the chunk
associated with addr as NOACCESS, and delete its
record of the chunk's existence.
VALGRIND_MEMPOOL_TRIM(pool, addr, size):
This request trims the chunks associated with pool.
The request only operates on chunks associated with
pool. Trimming is formally defined as:
All chunks entirely inside the range
addr..(addr+size-1) are preserved.
All chunks entirely outside the range
addr..(addr+size-1) are discarded, as though
VALGRIND_MEMPOOL_FREE was called on them.
All other chunks must intersect with the range
addr..(addr+size-1); areas outside the
intersection are marked as NOACCESS, as though they had been
independently freed with
VALGRIND_MEMPOOL_FREE.
This is a somewhat rare request, but can be useful in implementing the type of mass-free operations common in custom LIFO allocators.
VALGRIND_MOVE_MEMPOOL(poolA, poolB): This
request informs Memcheck that the pool previously anchored at
address poolA has moved to anchor address
poolB. This is a rare request, typically only needed
if you realloc the header of a mempool.
No memory-status bits are altered by this request.
VALGRIND_MEMPOOL_CHANGE(pool, addrA, addrB,
size): This request informs Memcheck that the chunk
previously allocated at address addrA within
pool has been moved and/or resized, and should be
changed to cover the region addrB..(addrB+size-1). This
is a rare request, typically only needed if you
realloc a superblock or wish to extend a chunk
without changing its memory-status bits.
No memory-status bits are altered by this request.
VALGRIND_MEMPOOL_EXISTS(pool):
This request informs the caller whether or not Memcheck is currently
tracking a mempool at anchor address pool. It
evaluates to 1 when there is a mempool associated with that address, 0
otherwise. This is a rare request, only useful in circumstances when
client code might have lost track of the set of active mempools.
Memcheck supports debugging of distributed-memory applications
which use the MPI message passing standard. This support consists of a
library of wrapper functions for the
PMPI_* interface. When incorporated
into the application's address space, either by direct linking or by
LD_PRELOAD, the wrappers intercept
calls to PMPI_Send,
PMPI_Recv, etc. They then
use client requests to inform Memcheck of memory state changes caused
by the function being wrapped. This reduces the number of false
positives that Memcheck otherwise typically reports for MPI
applications.
The wrappers also take the opportunity to carefully check
size and definedness of buffers passed as arguments to MPI functions, hence
detecting errors such as passing undefined data to
PMPI_Send, or receiving data into a
buffer which is too small.
Unlike most of the rest of Valgrind, the wrapper library is subject to a
BSD-style license, so you can link it into any code base you like.
See the top of mpi/libmpiwrap.c
for license details.
The wrapper library will be built automatically if possible.
Valgrind's configure script will look for a suitable
mpicc to build it with. This must be
the same mpicc you use to build the
MPI application you want to debug. By default, Valgrind tries
mpicc, but you can specify a
different one by using the configure-time option
--with-mpicc. Currently the
wrappers are only buildable with
mpiccs which are based on GNU
GCC or Intel's C++ Compiler.
Check that the configure script prints a line like this:
checking for usable MPI2-compliant mpicc and mpi.h... yes, mpicc
If it says ... no, your
mpicc has failed to compile and link
a test MPI2 program.
If the configure test succeeds, continue in the usual way with
make and make
install. The final install tree should then contain
libmpiwrap-<platform>.so.
Compile up a test MPI program (eg, MPI hello-world) and try this:
LD_PRELOAD=$prefix/lib/valgrind/libmpiwrap-<platform>.so \
mpirun [args] $prefix/bin/valgrind ./hello
You should see something similar to the following
valgrind MPI wrappers 31901: Active for pid 31901 valgrind MPI wrappers 31901: Try MPIWRAP_DEBUG=help for possible options
repeated for every process in the group. If you do not see these, there is an build/installation problem of some kind.
The MPI functions to be wrapped are assumed to be in an ELF
shared object with soname matching
libmpi.so*. This is known to be
correct at least for Open MPI and Quadrics MPI, and can easily be
changed if required.
Compile your MPI application as usual, taking care to link it
using the same mpicc that your
Valgrind build was configured with.
Use the following basic scheme to run your application on Valgrind with the wrappers engaged:
MPIWRAP_DEBUG=[wrapper-args] \ LD_PRELOAD=$prefix/lib/valgrind/libmpiwrap-<platform>.so \ mpirun [mpirun-args] \ $prefix/bin/valgrind [valgrind-args] \ [application] [app-args]
As an alternative to
LD_PRELOADing
libmpiwrap-<platform>.so, you can
simply link it to your application if desired. This should not disturb
native behaviour of your application in any way.
Environment variable
MPIWRAP_DEBUG is consulted at
startup. The default behaviour is to print a starting banner
valgrind MPI wrappers 16386: Active for pid 16386 valgrind MPI wrappers 16386: Try MPIWRAP_DEBUG=help for possible options
and then be relatively quiet.
You can give a list of comma-separated options in
MPIWRAP_DEBUG. These are
verbose:
show entries/exits of all wrappers. Also show extra
debugging info, such as the status of outstanding
MPI_Requests resulting
from uncompleted MPI_Irecvs.
quiet:
opposite of verbose, only print
anything when the wrappers want
to report a detected programming error, or in case of catastrophic
failure of the wrappers.
warn:
by default, functions which lack proper wrappers
are not commented on, just silently
ignored. This causes a warning to be printed for each unwrapped
function used, up to a maximum of three warnings per function.
strict:
print an error message and abort the program if
a function lacking a wrapper is used.
If you want to use Valgrind's XML output facility
(--xml=yes), you should pass
quiet in
MPIWRAP_DEBUG so as to get rid of any
extraneous printing from the wrappers.
All MPI2 functions except
MPI_Wtick,
MPI_Wtime and
MPI_Pcontrol have wrappers. The
first two are not wrapped because they return a
double, which Valgrind's
function-wrap mechanism cannot handle (but it could easily be
extended to do so). MPI_Pcontrol cannot be
wrapped as it has variable arity:
int MPI_Pcontrol(const int level, ...)
Most functions are wrapped with a default wrapper which does
nothing except complain or abort if it is called, depending on
settings in MPIWRAP_DEBUG listed
above. The following functions have "real", do-something-useful
wrappers:
PMPI_Send PMPI_Bsend PMPI_Ssend PMPI_Rsend PMPI_Recv PMPI_Get_count PMPI_Isend PMPI_Ibsend PMPI_Issend PMPI_Irsend PMPI_Irecv PMPI_Wait PMPI_Waitall PMPI_Test PMPI_Testall PMPI_Iprobe PMPI_Probe PMPI_Cancel PMPI_Sendrecv PMPI_Type_commit PMPI_Type_free PMPI_Pack PMPI_Unpack PMPI_Bcast PMPI_Gather PMPI_Scatter PMPI_Alltoall PMPI_Reduce PMPI_Allreduce PMPI_Op_create PMPI_Comm_create PMPI_Comm_dup PMPI_Comm_free PMPI_Comm_rank PMPI_Comm_size PMPI_Error_string PMPI_Init PMPI_Initialized PMPI_Finalize
A few functions such as
PMPI_Address are listed as
HAS_NO_WRAPPER. They have no wrapper
at all as there is nothing worth checking, and giving a no-op wrapper
would reduce performance for no reason.
Note that the wrapper library itself can itself generate large
numbers of calls to the MPI implementation, especially when walking
complex types. The most common functions called are
PMPI_Extent,
PMPI_Type_get_envelope,
PMPI_Type_get_contents, and
PMPI_Type_free.
MPI-1.1 structured types are supported, and walked exactly.
The currently supported combiners are
MPI_COMBINER_NAMED,
MPI_COMBINER_CONTIGUOUS,
MPI_COMBINER_VECTOR,
MPI_COMBINER_HVECTOR
MPI_COMBINER_INDEXED,
MPI_COMBINER_HINDEXED and
MPI_COMBINER_STRUCT. This should
cover all MPI-1.1 types. The mechanism (function
walk_type) should extend easily to
cover MPI2 combiners.
MPI defines some named structured types
(MPI_FLOAT_INT,
MPI_DOUBLE_INT,
MPI_LONG_INT,
MPI_2INT,
MPI_SHORT_INT,
MPI_LONG_DOUBLE_INT) which are pairs
of some basic type and a C int.
Unfortunately the MPI specification makes it impossible to look inside
these types and see where the fields are. Therefore these wrappers
assume the types are laid out as struct { float val;
int loc; } (for
MPI_FLOAT_INT), etc, and act
accordingly. This appears to be correct at least for Open MPI 1.0.2
and for Quadrics MPI.
If strict is an option specified
in MPIWRAP_DEBUG, the application
will abort if an unhandled type is encountered. Otherwise, the
application will print a warning message and continue.
Some effort is made to mark/check memory ranges corresponding to
arrays of values in a single pass. This is important for performance
since asking Valgrind to mark/check any range, no matter how small,
carries quite a large constant cost. This optimisation is applied to
arrays of primitive types (double,
float,
int,
long, long
long, short,
char, and long
double on platforms where sizeof(long
double) == 8). For arrays of all other types, the
wrappers handle each element individually and so there can be a very
large performance cost.
For the most part the wrappers are straightforward. The only significant complexity arises with nonblocking receives.
The issue is that MPI_Irecv
states the recv buffer and returns immediately, giving a handle
(MPI_Request) for the transaction.
Later the user will have to poll for completion with
MPI_Wait etc, and when the
transaction completes successfully, the wrappers have to paint the
recv buffer. But the recv buffer details are not presented to
MPI_Wait -- only the handle is. The
library therefore maintains a shadow table which associates
uncompleted MPI_Requests with the
corresponding buffer address/count/type. When an operation completes,
the table is searched for the associated address/count/type info, and
memory is marked accordingly.
Access to the table is guarded by a (POSIX pthreads) lock, so as to make the library thread-safe.
The table is allocated with
malloc and never
freed, so it will show up in leak
checks.
Writing new wrappers should be fairly easy. The source file is
mpi/libmpiwrap.c. If possible,
find an existing wrapper for a function of similar behaviour to the
one you want to wrap, and use it as a starting point. The wrappers
are organised in sections in the same order as the MPI 1.1 spec, to
aid navigation. When adding a wrapper, remember to comment out the
definition of the default wrapper in the long list of defaults at the
bottom of the file (do not remove it, just comment it out).
The wrappers should reduce Memcheck's false-error rate on MPI applications. Because the wrapping is done at the MPI interface, there will still potentially be a large number of errors reported in the MPI implementation below the interface. The best you can do is try to suppress them.
You may also find that the input-side (buffer
length/definedness) checks find errors in your MPI use, for example
passing too short a buffer to
MPI_Recv.
Functions which are not wrapped may increase the false
error rate. A possible approach is to run with
MPI_DEBUG containing
warn. This will show you functions
which lack proper wrappers but which are nevertheless used. You can
then write wrappers for them.
A known source of potential false errors are the
PMPI_Reduce family of functions, when
using a custom (user-defined) reduction function. In a reduction
operation, each node notionally sends data to a "central point" which
uses the specified reduction function to merge the data items into a
single item. Hence, in general, data is passed between nodes and fed
to the reduction function, but the wrapper library cannot mark the
transferred data as initialised before it is handed to the reduction
function, because all that happens "inside" the
PMPI_Reduce call. As a result you
may see false positives reported in your reduction function.